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ABSTRACT
The two models of international trade with developed factor markets -- Heckscher-Ohlin and
Specific Factors -- both suffer significant defects. For example, their predictions about the patterns
of domestic production and international trade are for the most part either indeterminate or uselessly
complex. The problem with these models is that the supply of factors to an industry is either
perfectly elastic or perfectly inelastic. Using a model in which heterogeneous workers sort across
industries we eliminate this problem. The result is a multi-good model with sharp predictions about
(1) the domestic pattern of production, (2) North-North and North-South trade, (3) the demand for
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The two models of international trade with developed factor markets ￿Heckscher-Ohlin
and Speci￿c Factors ￿both su⁄er signi￿cant defects. For example, their predictions about
the patterns of domestic production and international trade are unsatisfying. Except in
the case of two goods and two factors, Heckscher-Ohlin production and trade patterns are
either indeterminate or uselessly complex. In the Speci￿c Factors model, these patterns have
little intuitive appeal (Jones and Neary, 1984, page 24). For another example, the Speci￿c
Factors model was developed in order to explain why industries rather than factors lobby
for protection (Mayer, 1974; Mussa, 1974). Unfortunately, the explanation is driven entirely
by the deus ex machina assumption of immobile factors. This raises questions about what
economic process generates the cross-industry distribution of immobile factors and why the
immobility itself is not explained by the theory (Leamer, 1980; Grossman, 1983).
We show that these problems stem from the extreme assumption that factors are either
perfectly mobile across industries or perfectly immobile. To avoid this problem we model
labour markets using the Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) variant of the Roy (1950, 1951)
model which describes the sorting behaviour of heterogenous workers endowed with two
attributes e.g., problem-solving and communication skills.1 Workers sort across industries
based on Ricardian comparative advantage. Industries di⁄er by skill requirements and each
worker sorts into the industry that pays the most for her particular bundle of skills. As
a result, each heterogeneous worker has a preference for a particular industry because the
1Leamer (1999), Grossman and Maggi (2000) and Grossman (2004) o⁄er very interesting trade models
featuring worker sorting, but the sorting and hence the predictions are very di⁄erent from our own. This
will become clear shortly.
2next best alternative industry pays discretely less. Further, heterogeneity of workers means
that even within an industry some workers are less productive and hence less well paid than
others. These least productive workers will be the ￿rst to switch out of the industry should
￿rms in the industry lower wages. This makes each industry￿ s partial equilibrium supply of
labour slope upwards. Restated, unlike the Heckscher-Ohlin and Speci￿c Factors models,
factors are neither perfectly mobile nor perfectly immobile and the degree of mobility is
generated endogenously.
This simple alternative to the Heckscher-Ohlin and Speci￿c Factors models leads to
￿ve important results. First, we obtain a complete generalization of the Rybczynski and
Heckscher-Ohlin theorems for the case of arbitrarily many industries. Partial mobility is the
key to this remarkable result since it implies that industry supply functions are continuous
and upward sloping. In contrast, in the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian models industry
supply is discontinuous and in￿nitely elastic where price equals average cost. In the Spe-
ci￿c Factors model the arti￿ce of exogenous speci￿city makes industry supply continuous
and upward sloping, but this comes at a cost: the patterns of domestic production and
international trade have little intuitive appeal. Further, the patterns depend heavily on the
cross-industry distribution of speci￿c factors, a distribution that is exogenous and for which
little intuition is available.
Second, partial mobility leads to new predictions about the political economy of pro-
tection. A worker who is a very good ￿t with the industry is endogenously immobile and
demands protection for her industry. A worker who is only a modestly good ￿t with the
industry is endogenously more mobile and will support protection for all industries that
3intensively use her type. The tension between the ￿ long-run￿Stolper-Samuelson prediction
about factor-based lobbying and the ￿ short-run￿speci￿c factors prediction about industry-
based lobbying is eliminated. Leamer (1980) and Grossman (1983) were the ￿rst to recognize
and deal with this tension. However, our resolution improves considerably on this earlier
research by eliminating the need for exogenous mobility costs.
Third, while the e⁄ects on trade of international di⁄erences in average endowments are
well known, nothing is known about the e⁄ects of other moments of the distribution of
worker types. For example, since average endowments per capita are similar across rich
countries it is often argued that the distribution of endowments cannot explain North-
North trade. However, it is also often argued that di⁄erences between Japanese and U.S.
workers in￿ uence production patterns and comparative advantage. For example, Japanese
comparative advantage in goods involving long chains of production and requiring reliability
is often ascribed to a more uniform distribution of such skills as e⁄ective communication
in worker circles. We model this in terms of higher moments of the distribution of worker
characteristics. The idea that higher moments matter was put forward by Grossman and
Maggi (2000) and Grossman (2004). We extend their insights using a very di⁄erent model
of labour markets.
Fourth, our model easily handles international technology di⁄erences without requiring
it. Countries that use older vintages of technology survive by skimming the cream, that
is, by operating at a smaller level of output and employing only those few workers whose
skills are almost a perfect match for older-vintage technologies. While almost perfect, these
matches are less productive and less well paying than rich-country matches of workers to
4new-vintage technologies. This is an essential observation for development economics where
the international coexistence of old and new technologies has long been highlighted (Pack,
1984).
Fifth, the predictions of the model do not require factor price equalization. Worker
earnings can di⁄er across countries and will di⁄er within industries because of di⁄erences
in worker skills. As a result, we are able to develop the rich predictions about inequality
associated with the Roy model. We discuss within-group inequality and within-industry
inequality and then investigate the impact of trade and skill-biased technical change on
these inequality measures.
The model we will be presenting is most closely related to the international trade model
of Leamer (1999). Leamer considers a model with sorting based on a single worker character-
istic, namely e⁄ort. E⁄ort complements capital which leads to worker sorting. Introducing a
second worker characteristic, as we do, leads to additional and important predictions about
production, trade, earnings and inequality.
Our work on North-North trade is strongly in￿ uenced by Grossman and Maggi (2000)
and Grossman (2004) though the mechanisms are di⁄erent. In Grossman and Maggi (2000)
machines are produced in long chains of production involving many workers. The machine
is reliable only if each worker￿ s input is reliable. This ￿ supermodularity￿means that in
equilibrium each hired worker will have a minimum level of talent. In contrast, software
output depends on the input of the most talented worker. This ￿ submodularity￿means
that one hired worker will be highly talented and the remaining workers untalented. The
main prediction is that the country with the greater dispersion in worker talents will have
5a comparative advantage in software. In our model there is no teamwork between workers,
but there is ￿ teamwork￿between the two attributes that a worker brings to the workplace.
This leads to our section 5 trade-and-dispersion result. In Grossman (2004), machinery
requires teamwork and software does not. Teamwork is subject to costly monitoring and
incomplete contracting, which encourages talented workers to sort into software. Trade
leads the country with greater dispersion in talent to increase software production. This
resolves the contracting problem for talented workers, thus raising inequality. In contrast,
our section 5 inequality-and-dispersion result is driven by sorting rather than incomplete
contracting.
Our research is also related to an excellent paper by Ru¢ n (1999) who uses Rosen￿ s
(1978) model of two-factor sorting to explain away the tension between the political economy
predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin and Speci￿c Factors models. However, in his model
worker heterogeneity is not enough to explain away the tension. His argument relies critically
on allowing capital to be perfectly mobile across industries, something we will not need or
want: worker heterogeneity even without any capital accomplishes the same end in a crystal
clear way. This last point indicates that our work is related to Melitz (2003) who uses ￿rm
heterogeneity to generate an upward-sloping supply of ￿rms into export markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2-3 set up the model. Sections 4-6 develop
multi-good Rybczynski, Heckscher-Ohlin, and income distribution theorems for higher-order
moments of the distribution of endowments. Sections 7-9 describe the implications of the
model for political economy, international technology di⁄erences and domestic income in-
equality.
62. The Model
Each worker brings two attributes to the workplace, h and l. While human capital and
brawn are obvious and familiar attributes, in describing trade among rich countries we also
have in mind subtler attributes such as problem-solving abilities, communication skills, and
team-work skills. A type (h;l) worker employed in industry i produces a task level of ti(h;l).
Each worker chooses the industry that pays the most for her attributes. This leads to worker
sorting based on the standard logic of Ricardian comparative advantage.2
An employer cannot unbundle a worker￿ s attributes and thus cares only about ti(h;l).
This ￿ bundling￿assumption is the core assumption of a large class of Roy-like (1950; 1951)
models. The particular formulation used here is due to Heckman and Sedlacek (1985).3
For simplicity we make two assumptions which together ensure that a worker￿ s marginal
product is log-linear in h and l. First, we assume that industry output Yi is the sum of the
tasks performed by workers in the industry. Mathematically, if industry i employs a set of






ti(h;l) fhl(h;l) dl dh (1)
where fhl(h;l) is the measure or number of (h;l) types in the economy and where Ai is a
Hicks-neutral technology parameter. The linearity of output in worker tasks is the standard
2The logic is usually stated as follows. With two industries and two workers types (h;l) and (h0;l0),
t1(h;l)=t2(h;l) > t1(h0;l0)=t2(h0;l0) implies that the (h;l) type sorts into industry 1 and the (h0;l0) type
sorts into industry 2. This Ricardian sorting mechanism is fundamental to our model. We repeat it here
only because it will be harder to see once more structure is added to the model.
3See also Rosen (1972, 1974, 1981), Willis and Rosen (1979), Sattinger (1980), Heckman and Scheinkman
(1987), Bartel and Sicherman (1999) and especially Rosen (1978) and Heckman and HonorØ (1990).
7simpli￿cation in the sorting literature because it implies that a worker￿ s marginal product is
independent of the characteristics of other workers in the industry e.g., Heckman and Sed-
lacek (1985). Notice that we have no other inputs such as capital. These can be introduced
but add no additional insights. Given equation (1), the log earnings of a type (h;l) worker
is
wi(h;l) = lnqi + lnAi + lnti(h;l)
where qi is the producer price.
Second, we assume that the task function is log-linear: ti(h;l) ￿ h￿il1￿￿i. Without loss
of generality, we rank industries such that ￿i is increasing in i. In this way, i indexes the
h-intensity of the industry. This is needed for Heckscher-Ohlin-style predictions.4
Under these two assumptions, equilibrium with sorting is easily characterized. To facil-
itate this, de￿ne
L ￿ lnl; S ￿ ln(h=l); and pi ￿ lnqi + lnAi: (2)
4While the production function (1) and the task function ti are uncomfortably restrictive, they are more
general than what has been used in the sorting literature. One can distinguish three types of sorting models
based on the number of worker types and the number of industries.
1. In models with a continuum of industries, there is perfect sorting so that all workers in an industry
are the same in key aspects e.g., Sattinger (1975) and Teulings (1995). This allows one to generalize
the industry production function. However, the continuum-of-industries assumption is useless here
because it is precisely the heterogeneity of workers within each industry that interests us.
2. In models with only 2 industries, one can always rede￿ne or ￿ rotate￿attributes so that only one factor
is used in each industry e.g., Heckman and HonorØ (1990) and Ru¢ n (1999). In our setting, this is
equivalent to setting ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = 1. Since we allow for n > 2, such rotation is not possible and
our approach is clearly more general.
3. In the remaining models (2 < n < 1), either there is a ￿nite number of worker types or a Leontief
production assumption e.g., Rosen (1978). Again, our production function is more general than this
and the generality is substantive.
8Then lnti = L+￿iSi and the log earnings of a type (S;L) worker employed in industry i is
given by
wi(S;L) = pi + L + ￿iS. (3)
Sorting is illustrated in ￿gure 1 which plots wi(S;L) ￿ L = pi + ￿iS against S. The ￿gure
plots these earnings pro￿les for industries i ￿ 1, i, and i + 1. A worker with an S between
Si￿1 and Si chooses industry i. Si satis￿es pi +￿iSi = pi+1 +￿i+1Si i.e., worker type (Si;L)
earns the same in industries i and i + 1. Thus, the sorting rule is





; S0 ￿ ￿1; and Sn ￿ 1: (5)
As drawn in ￿gure 1, the line for industry i lies above the intersection of the lines for
industries i￿1 and i+1. This ensures that the Si are increasing in i; as we have implicitly
assumed in equation (4). If this is not the case then no worker chooses industry i and
industry i has no domestic employment. It is therefore convenient to let i = 1;:::;n index
industries with positive domestic employment. Then the Si are increasing in i.
Figure 1 highlights a key feature of the model. Suppose ￿rms in industry i o⁄er slightly
higher earnings so that the wi(S;L)￿L pro￿le shifts up. Then industry i ￿rms will attract
slightly more workers (those with S near either Si￿1 or Si). That is, the partial equilibrium
supply of workers to the industry is upward sloping. This di⁄ers from the Heckscher-Ohlin
and Speci￿c Factors models. In the former, a slight rise in industry wages attracts an in￿nite









Figure 1: Worker Sorting.
supply of workers. In the latter, a slight rise in industry wages attracts either an in￿nite
supply or no additional supply depending on whether labour is the mobile or immobile
factor. Our model lies in between these extremes.
Note also that an upward-sloping supply of workers will imply an upward-sloping indus-
try supply function. This does not appear in the Heckscher-Ohlin model (except via general
equilibrium feedbacks) and appears in the Speci￿c Factors model only through the deus ex
machina of an exogenous ￿xed factor.5
5The fact that an employer cannot unbundle a worker￿ s attributes and thus cares only about ti(h;l)
is important for generating an upward-sloping supply of workers. Indeed, bundling is a standard sorting-
literature device for inducing upward-sloping supplies. Further, upward-sloping supplies are often taken as
evidence in favour of the bundling hypothesis. More formal evidence from structural econometric models
10With the sorting rule in place it is useful to ￿ll in the details of the equation (1) expression
for output Yi. From equation (2), ti = h￿il1￿￿i = (h=l)￿il = exp(￿iS +L). Let fSL(S;L) be






exp(￿iS + L) fSL(S;L) dL dS: (6)
Turning to the de￿nition of equilibrium, labour market equilibrium is described by a set
of earnings functions wi (S;L); i = 1;:::;n that satisfy pro￿t-maximizing demand for tasks
(equation 3) and earnings-maximizing supply of tasks (equation 4). Product markets are
perfectly competitive and equilibrium in product markets is described by a set of producer
prices q1;:::qn. We will sometimes discuss the determination of the qi, especially when
comparing autarky with free trade. At other times we will take the qi to be exogenous. This
is in keeping with a small open economy facing exogenous world product prices and trade
costs.
For some of the results of this paper we will need to make an assumption about fSL(S;L).
Since there are no scale e⁄ects in the economy we take fSL to be a density function i.e., a
positive function that integrates to unity. We follow the time-honoured tradition in the Roy
can be found in Willis and Rosen (1979), Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), Heckman and Scheinkman (1987),
and Bartel and Sicherman (1999).
If workers can unbundle their h and l and take them to di⁄erent industries then we are in a Heckscher-
Ohlin world. If they must take their h and l to the same industry, but ￿rms can unbundle workers￿h and
l (i.e., the ￿rm only cares about the aggregate amounts of h and l that are hired) then we are almost in a
Heckscher-Ohlin world, though now both countries and ￿rms must be in the factor price equalization set.
This point is developed in a debate between Welch (1969) and Rosen (1983).
6fSL(S;L) is induced trivially by fhl(h;l) together with equation (2).



































￿ is the correlation between S and L. ￿ and ￿L are not particularly interesting parameters
so that we almost always set them to unity. All results in this paper hold for the general
case of ￿ 6= 1 and ￿L 6= 1: This is explicitly shown in the appendix proofs where we do
not restrict ￿ or ￿L. Appendix C gives an expression for output under the assumption of
normality.
3. The Role of Two Attributes: Income Distribution
The obvious thing about ￿gure 1 is that workers are sorting based on the single attribute S
just as in Leamer (1999). What then is the role of two attributes? It turns out that both
attributes are needed to discuss production, earnings, and earnings inequality. In particular,
￿ is crucial. To see this recall that under normality the expectation of L given S is
E(LjS) = ￿(S ￿ ￿): (8)
From this and equation (3), the average log wages of type S workers who have sorted into
industry i is
E(wi(S;L)jS ) = pi ￿ ￿￿ + (￿i + ￿)S: (9)
The top panel of ￿gure 2 plots E(LjS) against S and plots a contour line for fSL(S;L) for
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= pi - rm + (bi + r)S
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Figure 2: Income Distribution.
the case where ￿ < 0. The bottom panel plots E( wi(S;L)j S ) against S for the case of two
industries. This wage pro￿le is piecewise linear with slope ￿i+￿ on S 2 (Si￿1;Si). The ￿ and
￿ terms correspond to productivity and two-attribute sorting e⁄ects, respectively. Holding
L constant, @wi(S;L)=@S = @ lnti(S;L)=@S = ￿i. That is, workers with more S produce
more ti and hence earn more. This is the productivity e⁄ect. Further, @E(LjS)=@S = ￿
i.e., the average amount of L that an S type has depends on ￿. If ￿ is negative then higher
13S is associated with lower L and hence with lower productivity and earnings. This is the
two-attribute sorting e⁄ect.
Figure 2 displays the case where ￿1 + ￿ < 0 < ￿2 + ￿ so that the two-attribute sorting
e⁄ect dominates in industry 1 and the productivity e⁄ect dominates in industry 2. More
generally, the average earnings pro￿le illustrated in ￿gure 2 can be downward sloping, V-
shaped, or upward sloping. The message to be taken from this is that while S determines
worker sorting, it does not determine the amount of the other productive asset L that
workers bring to the workplace. Thus, S alone does not determine output, earnings, or
inequality.
4. Have and Have-Not Economies (￿)
The next three sections describe the role of the distribution of endowments for the patterns
of production and trade. We start with ￿. An economy with a high positive value of ￿ is a
￿ have and have-not￿economy. Workers either have a lot of both S and L or have very little of
both S and L. International di⁄erences in ￿ are readily explained by a host of international
di⁄erences in institutions and policies. For example, Sweden has a strong institutional bias
towards redistribution and extensive social policies involving early childhood interventions
which ensure that each worker obtains at least one marketable attribute.7 In contrast, in
the United States where these institutions and policies are muted, the acquisition of S and
L are more highly correlated because acquisition is driven by causes such as parental income
that a⁄ect both S and L. This is consistent with evidence that intergenerational mobility
7See Tre￿ er (2004) for further discussion.
14is lower in the United States than in countries such as Sweden and Canada (Bj￿rklund and
J￿nti 1997; Blanden 2004). See Solon (2002) for a survey. Thus it is of interest to assume
that the Swedish ￿ is smaller than the U.S. ￿. We now investigate the implications of this
for the patterns of production and trade.
4.1. Production: Rybczynski Revisited
To get the ￿ avour of things, let￿ s return to the 2-industry example of ￿gure 2. The ￿gure
is reproduced on the right side of ￿gure 3. The left side illustrates the case of ￿ > 0. A
rise in ￿ causes E(LjS) = ￿(S ￿ ￿) to pivot around the point (￿;0). To keep ￿gure 3
simple, we have drawn it for the case where S1 = ￿. Note that the rise in ￿ does not
alter the sorting rule S1. (See equation 5.) The bottom panels of ￿gure 3 plot E(wijS).
Since E(lntijS) = E(wijS) ￿ pi, the bottom-panel wage pro￿les are similar to the output
pro￿les.
As ￿ rises the average level of L falls for workers with endowment S < S1 so that the
average level of output Y1 falls. For workers with endowment S > S1, the opposite is true so
that Y2 rises. This is a Rybczynski-style result: as ￿ rises, Y2 rises relative to Y1. Rybczynski
results typically hold in clear form only when there are two industries. A remarkable feature
of our ￿gure 3 result is that it holds for any number of industries.
Theorem 1. d(Yi=Yi￿1)=d￿ > 0 for i = 1;2;:::;n. That is, an increase in the correla-
tion between S and L increases the output of S-intensive industries relative to L-intensive
industries.
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Figure 3: The Impact of ￿:
notation. De￿ne
S
￿ ￿ S ￿ ￿ and S
￿
i ￿ Si ￿ ￿: (10)
Let g(S￿;L) be an arbitrary function of (S￿;L) and let E(g(S￿;L)ja < S￿ < b) be the
expectation of g for those workers with an S￿ between a and b.8 The following lemma will
be used repeatedly.
8If this is not clear see the precise mathematical statement in appendix equation (18).
16Lemma 1. De￿ne Ei(x) ￿ E
￿
S￿ + xjS￿
i￿1 ￿ x < S￿ < S￿
i ￿ x
￿
, x 2 R. Then Ei￿1(￿) <
S￿
i￿1 < Ei(￿) < S￿
i .
Proof of Lemma 1: S￿
i￿1 ￿ x < S￿ < S￿
i ￿ x implies S￿
i￿1 < S￿ + x < S￿
i . Hence
S￿
i￿1 < Ei(￿) < S￿
i . Likewise, S￿
i￿2 < Ei￿1(￿) < S￿
i￿1 so that Ei￿1(￿) < S￿
i￿1. ￿




= Ei(￿i + ￿) ￿ ￿. (11)
Hence dln(Yi=Yi￿1)=d￿ = Ei(￿i + ￿) ￿ Ei￿1(￿i￿1 + ￿). From lemma 1, Ei(￿i + ￿) > S￿
i￿1 >
Ei￿1(￿i￿1 + ￿) for i > 1 so that dln(Yi=Yi￿1)=d￿ > 0. ￿
As ￿ rises, Yi rises relative to Yi￿1. It would be nice to add to this the existence of
an industry i￿ such that all industries i > i￿ expand and all industries i ￿ i￿ contract. A
su¢ cient condition for this is S￿
1 < ￿ < S￿
n￿1.9 With many industries so that industries 1
and n are small (i.e., S￿
1 is a large negative number and S￿
n￿1 is a large positive number)
this condition will be satis￿ed.
4.2. Trade: Heckscher-Ohlin Revisited
In this section we consider trade patterns between two economies that di⁄er only in terms
of ￿. The conventional wisdom is that the similarity of endowments among Northern coun-
tries makes the Heckscher-Ohlin model irrelevant for describing North-North trade. Recent
9From lemma 1 and equation (11), S￿
i￿1 < dlnYi=d￿ + ￿ = Ei < S￿
i . Hence dlnY1=d￿ < S￿
1 ￿ ￿ which
is negative for S￿
1 < ￿. Further, dlnYn=d￿ > S￿
n￿1 ￿ ￿ which is positive for S￿
n￿1 > ￿. Since dlnYi=d￿
switches signs between i = 1 and i = n and is increasing in i there must exist an i￿ such that dlnYi=d￿ > 0
, i > i￿.
17research suggests otherwise by pointing out that North-North trade is partly driven by sub-
tle di⁄erence among Northern workforces in such dimensions as communication skills and
team-work. For example, consider studies of workplace change involving new technologies
combined with new forms of work organization such as team production, statistical process
control, and total quality management. As Osterman (1995) points out, the most strik-
ing assessments of the productivity bene￿ts of such workplace innovations are studies that
contrast U.S. and foreign ￿rms. There are two studies that will be known to economists.
Bailey and Gersbach (1995) demonstrate that communication and team skills, in additional
to technical skills, are much more important in German enterprises than in American enter-
prises. This results in a German comparative advantage in products involving long chains of
production. Murnane and Levy (1996) review di⁄erences in the worker screening practices
of U.S.-owned versus Japanese-owned auto plants located in the United States. Japanese
interviewers focus on the ability to solve problems in changing environments, the ability
to work in groups, and the ability to communicate e⁄ectively. Murnane and Levy (1996)
then show that Japanese screening for these skills translates into higher productivity. These
studies demonstrate that subtle di⁄erences in workers￿skills are important for productivity
and hence for comparative advantage.
To model this we begin by establishing that when there are only two industries, the low-￿
economy has a higher autarky price of good 2 (relative to good 1) and hence a comparative
advantage in the L-intensive industry 2.10 Assume that preferences are homothetic and
identical internationally. Also assume that the economies are identical except for di⁄erences
10With more than two industries, we know that strong comparative advantage theorems do not hold and
indeed comparative advantage is di¢ cult to de￿ne e.g., Dixit and Norman (1980, page 6).
18in ￿. It follows from theorem 1 that in autarky the low-￿ economy will have a low Y2=Y1
and hence a high relative price of good 2 (a high lnq2 ￿lnq1). The opening up of trade will
lower lnq2 ￿ lnq1. Since pi ￿ ln(qiAi), the opening up of trade will lower p2 ￿ p1 and, from
equation (5), raise S1. The rise in S1 leads to an expansion of industry 1 and a contraction
of industry 2. Further, the lower lnq2￿lnq1 raises consumer demand for industry 2 relative
to industry 1 so that in equilibrium, the low-￿ economy exports good 1 and imports good
2. That is, we obtain the standard comparative advantage results.
We turn next to a trade theorem for the multi-industry case. We make the usual
Heckscher-Ohlin similarity assumptions.
Assumption 1. (i) Preferences are homothetic and identical internationally. (ii) Technol-
ogy parameters Ai and ￿i are identical internationally. (iii) Consumers in all countries face
the same prices qi. (iv) Trade is balanced.
Theorem 2. Let assumption 1 hold. Also assume that the distribution of endowments
fSL(S;L) is the same internationally except that the correlation ￿ between S and L is larger
at home than abroad. Then there exists a unique industry i￿ < n such that the home
country exports all relatively S-intensive commodities (i > i￿) and imports all relatively
L-intensive commodities (i ￿ i￿).
The proof is simple and appears in appendix E.11
The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem predicts trade based on levels of S and L. Theorem
2 predicts trade based on a higher moment of the distribution of endowments. Also, in
11If i￿ > 1 then it is possible that the imports of industry i￿ are 0, but this requires a very particular set
of parameter values.
19contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin model our production and trade predictions are determinate
and easily described even when there are more than two goods.
4.3. Earnings and Inequality
We have already seen in the bottom panels of ￿gure 3 that as ￿ rises average earnings
fall in L-intensive industries (i ￿ i￿) and rise in S-intensive industries (i ￿ i￿). This is a
general result. From equations (9) and (10), E
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This implies that as ￿ rises average earnings fall in L-intensive industries and rise in S-
intensive industries.12 Thus, when comparing Sweden with the United States, the high-
￿ U.S. economy will have higher average wages in S-intensive industries as compared to
Sweden. The U.S. will also have lower average wages in L-intensive industries as compared
to Sweden.
We next turn to inequality. Our model has a lot to say about within-industry inequality
as measured by the variance of log earnings within an industry. To keep the notation
simple, let V(wi(S;L)ji) be the variance of wages conditional on choosing industry i (that
is, conditional on S￿
i￿1 < S￿ < S￿
i ). From appendix equation (26), this is just
12This follows from two facts. First, by lemma 1 the derivative is increasing in i. Second,
E(S￿jS￿
0 < S￿ < S￿
1) = E(S￿jS￿ < S￿
1) < E(S￿) = 0 and E
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+ (￿i + ￿)
2V(S
￿ ji):
The term 1 ￿ ￿2 is the within-group variance where ￿ group￿is de￿ned as the set of workers
with the same S. (￿i + ￿)2V(S￿ ji) is the between-group variance.13 Thus a rise in ￿
has within-group and between-group e⁄ects on inequality. In the case where ￿ < 0 and
￿i + ￿ > 0 for all i, the within- and between-group e⁄ects move in the same direction.
The high-￿ economy will have higher within-group, between-group, and within-industry
inequality in all industries.
Much of the empirical work on trade and wages has focussed on between-group inequality
e.g., production-nonproduction worker wage di⁄erentials. When ￿ > 0, as it most certainly
is in the United States, between-group inequality is rising in ￿.
One conclusion that emerges from this section is the care that is needed in isolating the
e⁄ects of trade on inequality. ￿ determines both the pattern of trade and the level of earnings
inequality. A ￿ that is higher in the United States than in Sweden causes both U.S.-Swedish
trade and higher between-group inequality in the United States than in Sweden. In trying
to assess the impact of trade on inequality in cross-country studies one must therefore be
very careful to ensure that the correlation between trade and inequality is not being driven
by a third, unobserved factor, namely ￿.
13At the risk of some di¢ cult but obvious notation, the standard within-between decomposition may be
written as
V( wi(S;L)j i) = E[ V(wi(S;L)jS) j i ] + V[ E(wi(S;L) j S) j i ]:
where the ￿rst and second terms on the right are the within-group and between-group variances, respectively.
215. Endowment inequality
We next turn to the role of endowment inequality. Consider two economies, one of which has
more mass in the tails of its bivariate density fSL(S;L) and hence has more individuals with
extreme values of either S or L. This will have implications for trade ￿ ows and inequality
that are related to those discussed in Grossman and Maggi (2000) and Grossman (2004).
As noted in the introduction, our trade mechanism is related to the Grossman and Maggi
(2000) supermodularity mechanism and our inequality mechanism is very di⁄erent from the
Grossman (2004) incomplete-contracts mechanism. To focus ideas consider ￿rst a simple
example with 3 goods: movies, information technologies, and machinery. The production of
Hollywood ￿ icks is intensive in creativity L and the production of Silicon Valley information
technologies is intensive in numericity S. In contrast, machinery is an ￿ O-Ring￿reliable good
whose production involves many components and whose overall reliability is the reliability
of the least reliable component. Reliability therefore depends on a mix of worker skills in the
sense of requiring both L and S. If, say, the United States has a more unequal distribution
of endowments than Germany, then the United States will export movies and information
technologies to Germany and Germany will export machinery to the United States.
Formalizing this is tricky because there is no good de￿nition of ￿ greater inequality￿for bi-
variate distributions. We proceed by de￿ning a form of mean-preserving spread for bivariate
distributions. To ease notation we have been setting the variance of S (￿) and the variance
of L (￿L) to unity. In this section we reintroduce ￿ and ￿L explicitly. We de￿ne a bivariate
mean-preserving spread as an increase in ￿ and ￿L that does not change means E(S) ￿ ￿ and
E(L) ￿ 0 or conditional means E(LjS) ￿ ￿￿L(S ￿￿)=￿ and E(SjL) ￿ ￿+￿￿(L￿0)=￿L.
22This is satis￿ed by increases in ￿ and ￿L that leave ￿=￿L unchanged. Let ￿ be an index
of endowment inequality and let ￿(￿) and ￿L(￿) be increasing unit-elastic functions so that
dln(￿=￿L)=dln￿ = 0. Then an increase in ￿ raises variances ￿ and ￿L without a⁄ecting
means or conditional means. We associate an increase in endowment inequality with an
increase in ￿.14
5.1. Production: Rybczynski Revisited
An increase in ￿ has no e⁄ect on the sorting rule (the Si) nor our diagrams. All that
an increase in ￿ does is redistribute the mass of fSL away from its middle towards its
tails. Therefore, the most L-intensive and S-intensive industries attract more workers and
experience a relative rise in output.
Theorem 3. Consider an increase in endowment inequality ￿. There exists a generically
unique industry i￿ with i￿ < n and with the following properties.
(1) Consider two L-intensive industries i.e., industries with i ￿ i￿. Then as inequality
rises, the more L-intensive of the two industries experiences a relative increase in
output: d(Yi￿1=Yi)=d￿ > 0 for all i ￿ i￿.
(2) Consider two S-intensive industries i.e., industries with i > i￿. Then as inequality
rises, the more S-intensive of the two industries experiences a relative increase in
output: d(Yi=Yi￿1)=d￿ > 0 for all i ￿ i￿ + 1.
14This parametrization of inequality satis￿es Atkinson and Bourguignon￿ s (1982) multivariate generaliza-
tion of second-order stochastic dominance, which they use to measure bivariate inequality.
23When i￿ > 1, part (1) states that dY1=d￿ > dY2=d￿ > ::: > dYi￿=d￿ and part (2) states
that dYn=d￿ > dYn￿1=d￿ > ::: > dYi￿=d￿. That is, the most L-intensive and S-intensive
industries expand relative to industries near i￿.
Proof: The proof is not di¢ cult, but requires some notation. De￿ne
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i(￿i￿ + ￿￿L) + ￿
2
L(1 ￿ ￿
2) ￿ 1: (13)
Let i￿ be the industry for which S￿
i￿￿1 < 0 ￿ S￿
i￿: Without loss of generality we ignore the
integer constraint and let i￿ be the industry for which S￿
i￿ = 0.
Consider part (1) of the theorem where i ￿ i￿ so that S￿
i￿1 < S￿
i ￿ 0. In this case,
the equation (12) condition S￿
i￿1 ￿ x < S￿ < S￿
i ￿ x implies S￿
i￿1 < S￿ + x < S￿
i < 0 or
S￿2
i < (S￿ + x)2 < S￿2




It follows that E2
i(￿) < S￿2
i￿1 < E2
i￿1(￿). Thus, dln(Yi￿1=Yi)=dln￿ = E2
i￿1(￿i￿1￿ + ￿￿L)￿
E2
i(￿i￿ + ￿￿L) > 0.




In this case, S￿
i￿1 ￿ x < S￿ < S￿
i ￿ x implies S￿2
i￿1 < (S￿ + x)2 < S￿2
i . Further, this is true
for all x. Restated, S￿2
i￿1 < E2
i(￿) < S￿2





i(￿i￿ + ￿￿L)￿ E2
i￿1(￿i￿1￿ + ￿￿L) > 0.
24Finally, consider part (2) of the theorem where i = i￿ + 1. If E2
i￿+1(￿i￿+1￿ + ￿￿L) >
E2
i￿(￿i￿￿ + ￿￿L) then dln(Yi￿+1=Yi￿)=dln￿ > 0 and we are done. If E2
i￿+1(￿i￿+1￿ + ￿￿L) <
E2
i￿(￿i￿￿ + ￿￿L) then dln(Yi￿1=Yi)=dln￿ > 0 for i = i￿ + 1 and the proof follows with i￿
replaced by i￿ + 1 in the statement of the theorem.15 ￿
5.2. Trade: Heckscher-Ohlin Revisited
North-North trade is left unexplained by the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model because aver-
age levels of endowments are similar across industrialized countries. Industrialized countries,
however, di⁄er in the inequality with which endowments are distributed. Theorem 3 shows
that international di⁄erences in Northern production patterns can be driven by endowment
inequality. This has immediate implications for trade.
First consider a comparison of autarky with free trade. Let assumption 1 hold and
suppose that there are only two countries, A and B, with country A having the higher level
of endowment inequality ￿. Theorem 3 implies that in autarky country A produces more of
the most L- and S-intensive goods than does country B. Hence A has a lower relative price
for these goods than does B. Hence, country A￿ s comparative advantage lies with the most
L- and S-intensive goods and A exports these goods while importing moderately L- and
S-intensive goods. Restated, endowment inequality is a source of comparative advantage
for L- and S-intensive goods.
To formalize this we will need i￿ in theorem 3 to be greater than 1 so that there is at
15If E2
i￿+1(￿i￿+1￿ + ￿￿L) = E2
i￿(￿i￿￿ + ￿￿L) then theorem 3 holds both for i￿ and i￿ + 1. This means
that i￿ is not unique and that dln(Yi￿+1=Yi￿)=dln￿ = 0, both of which violate the theorem. However,
for almost all parameters (i.e., generically), E2
i￿+1(￿i￿+1￿ + ￿￿L) 6= E2
i￿(￿i￿￿ + ￿￿L). It follows that i￿ is
generically unique and that dln(Yi￿+1=Yi￿)=dln￿ > 0 generically.
25least one extremely L-intensive industry (i = 1).
Theorem 4. Let assumption 1 hold and assume that i￿ > 1. Also assume that the distrib-
ution of endowments is more unequal in the home country than in the rest of the world i.e.,
the home country has a larger ￿ than the rest of the world. Then there exist two industries
i￿ and i￿ (with 1 ￿ i￿ < i￿ ￿ n ) such that the home country imports all goods i with
i￿ < i < i￿ and exports all other goods. That is, the home country exports all goods that
are either extremely L-intensive (i ￿ i￿) or extremely S-intensive (i ￿ i￿).
The proof is relegated to appendix G.
Theorem 4 demonstrates that di⁄erences in endowment inequality provide a coherent
account of trade between rich countries. To return to our example above, the United States
has greater endowment inequality than Germany. As a result, the United States has a
comparative advantage in Hollywood ￿ icks, which intensively use creativity L. The United
States also has a comparative advantage in Silicon Valley information technologies, which
intensively use numericity S. On the other hand, Germany has a comparative advantage in
machinery and other ￿ O-ring￿reliable goods produced using long chains of production and
for which each link requires moderate levels of both S and L in order to ensure reliability.
Our model also provides implications for inequality. We state without proof that the
country with greater endowment inequality will have greater within-industry inequality
V(wi(S;L) j i) in all industries.
266. Average endowments
We ￿nish up our discussion of endowments and trade with the role of the average level of
endowments. This is a standard Heckscher-Ohlin exercise. Intuitively, a country with a
high average S per worker (i.e., a high ￿) should have production patterns that are skewed
towards S-intensive goods. This in turn should lead the country to export S-intensive goods.
Theorem 5. d(Yi=Yi￿1)=d￿ > 0 for i > 1: That is, an increase in the mean level of S
increases the relative output of S-intensive industries.





= Ei(￿i + ￿) ￿ ￿ (14)
where Ei is de￿ned in lemma 1. Hence lemma 1 establishes that dlnYi=dln￿ is increasing
in i. ￿
As in the discussion following theorem 1, if there are many small industries then there
will be an industry i￿ such that output expands for the most S-intensive industries (i ￿ i￿)
and contracts for the most L-intensive industries (i < i￿). Note that i￿ is the same industry
as the i￿ industry in theorems 1 and 2.
The Rybczynski theorem 5 has immediate implications for trade ￿ ows.
Theorem 6. Let assumption 1 hold. Also assume that the home country is more S-
abundant than the foreign country in the sense of having a larger ￿. Then there exists
a unique industry i￿ > 1 such that the home country exports all relatively S-intensive
commodities i ￿ i￿ and imports all relatively L-intensive commodities i < i￿.
27See appendix I for the proof.
This is our counterpart to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. Note that we have obtained it
without reference to the number of goods, cones of diversi￿cation or factor price equalization.
7. The Political Economy of Protection
Although workers can move costlessly from industry to industry, our labour market does not
behave as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Rather, it behaves as a hybrid of the Heckscher-
Ohlin and Speci￿c Factors labour markets. This leads to demands for protection that
partly coalesce around factor-based lobbies as in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and partly
coalesce around industry-based lobbies as in the Speci￿c Factors model.
Key to our political economy prediction is the rent-seeking behaviour of workers. To see
this, consider the arrow in ￿gure 4. A type S worker who has selected into industry i earns
discretely more in industry i than in any other industry. From the worker￿ s perspective, this
earnings di⁄erential can be thought of as a rent associated with the existence of industry i.16
Now consider a tari⁄that raises the industry price qi. Since wi(S;L)￿L = lnqi+lnAi+￿iS,
the tari⁄ shifts up the industry-i wage pro￿le while leaving all other industry wage pro￿les
unchanged.
Which workers demand this protection? Workers near the middle of the interval [Si￿1;Si]
are endogenously immobile in the sense that it will take almost total industry collapse to
induce them to switch industries. These workers demand protection for their industry and
only their industry. To the extent that they succeed in organizing a lobby, the lobby will








Figure 4: The Endogeneity of Speci￿city.
be industry-based as in the Speci￿c Factors model. Workers who are near the boundary
Si￿1 are endogenously mobile in the sense that they will switch into industry i if industry i
receives a tari⁄and switch into industry i￿1 if industry i￿1 receives a tari⁄. These workers
do not demand protection for a particular industry. Rather, they demand protection for
industries that intensively use worker types near Si￿1. To the extent that such workers
succeed in organizing a lobby, the lobby will consist exclusively of workers whose S is near
Si￿1. That is, the lobby will be factor-based as in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
Such heterogeneous worker responses to changes in industry fortunes are frequently ob-
served in the data. In response to impending mass lay-o⁄s, workers who stay with the ￿rm
29typically do better than those who are laid o⁄, but do less well than those who voluntarily
quit. This is indicative of worker sorting. Workers who quit are closer to Si￿1 while those
who are laid o⁄ are closer to the middle of the interval. Jacobson et al. (1993) provide
strong evidence on these points using data drawn from the early 1980s import surge that
devastated the Pennsylvania steel industry. Casual empiricism suggests many other exam-
ples e.g., union members often disagree about whether or not to strike ￿workers near Si￿1,
who have good outside options, are less supportive of a strike than workers near the middle
of the interval [Si￿1;Si].
Returning to our prediction that industry-based and factor-based lobbies will coexist,
note that there is now abundant evidence that the Stolper-Samuelson and Speci￿c Factor
lobbying predictions are both partially supported by the evidence. Magee et al. (1989) and
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) ￿nd evidence in support of the proposition that industry-based
lobbying is important. Rogowski (1989), O￿ Rourke and Williamson (1999) and Slaughter
and Scheve (2001) present evidence in favour of the proposition that factor-based lobbying
is important. Tre￿ er (1993) and Beaulieu (2002) ￿nd evidence of both factor-based and
industry-based trade policy preferences. The coexistence of industry- and factor-based lob-
bying is always explained away by noting that industry-based lobbying dominates in the
short run while factor-based lobbying dominates in the long run as immobile factors melt
into mobility. However, the evidence for factor-based lobbying in Tre￿ er (1993), Slaughter
and Scheve (2001) and Beaulieu (2002) is short run. Further, many industry lobbies have
succeeded in obtaining long-run protection. For example, the steel industry has been pro-
tected since the 1960s despite the fact that all of its 1960s capital stock was written o⁄
30due to the introduction of new technologies such as the ￿ mini mill￿ . A simplistic distinc-
tion between long and short periods is clearly not rich enough to explain the coexistence of
industry- and factor-based lobbying. Our model points to the need for identifying the degree
of worker speci￿city and shows clearly how this is to be estimated in terms of a standard
econometric sorting model. Our model also shows that the degree of speci￿city and how it
evolves in response to industry shocks is central for explaining the evolution of international
trade protection.
Finally, despite important similarities between our model and the Speci￿c Factors model,
there are important di⁄erences. We have already seen one. In the Speci￿c Factors model
the speci￿c factor is homogeneous. In our model the speci￿c factor is heterogeneous and this
heterogeneity is both what generates upward-sloping industry supply functions and what
generates the coexistence of industry- and factor-based lobbying. A second di⁄erence is that
in the Speci￿c Factors model the speci￿c factor is exogenous, as is its distribution across
industries. In our model the degree of speci￿city and the distribution of the speci￿c factor
across industries is endogenous. This provides both a deeper level of explanation and results
in sharper predictions about trade and the political economy of protection.
8. International Technology Di⁄erences
In the Ricardian model and in extensions to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, international tech-
nology di⁄erences typically lead to specialization. This is hard to reconcile with work by
Pack (1984) and others on the international coexistence of di⁄erent vintages of technology.








Figure 5: International Technology Di⁄erences Without Specialization.
ming the cream, that is, by operating at a smaller level of output and employing only those
few workers whose skills are almost a perfect match for the industry￿ s needs. Poor countries
compete by foregoing all rents associated with these skills.
More formally, consider ￿gure 5 which plots the wage pro￿les wi(S;L) ￿ L = lnqi +
lnAi + ￿iS. Recall that Ai is a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter. Since rich countries
typically have higher productivity than poor countries, assume ARich
i > APoor
i . Consider
the pro￿les labeled ARich
i and APoor
i . Although ARich
i > APoor
i , the poor country continues
to produce good _ i. That is, international technology di⁄erences need not lead to Ricardian
specialization. Poor countries compete by accepting lower wages. Comparing identical
32workers in rich and poor countries, the ratio of wages will be ARich
i =APoor
i .
How large can international technology di⁄erences be before there is Ricardian special-
ization i.e., before the rich country becomes the sole producer of i? When APoor
i drops to Ai
or below, the poor country is so unproductive in industry i that the poor-country industry
shuts down. Ai is trivial to compute. Noting from equations (2)-(5) that Si￿1 and Si are
linear in Ai, Ai satis￿es the linear equation Si￿1(Ai) = Si(Ai). The next theorem formalizes
these points and o⁄ers a trade prediction.
Theorem 7. Consider international di⁄erences in technology Ai.
1. A rise in Ai raises output in industry i (dYi=dAi > 0), lowers output in industries i￿1
and i + 1 (dYi￿1=dAi < 0, dYi+1=dAi < 0), and leaves output in all other industries
unchanged (dYj=dAi = 0 for j 6= i ￿ 1;i;i + 1).
2. Let assumption 1 hold except that Ai is higher in the home country than in the foreign
country. (a) If Ai > Ai in both countries then good i is produced in both countries.
(b) The home country exports good i while importing goods i ￿ 1 and i + 1.
With only two goods, the theoremreduces to the standard Ricardian result, namely, dY2=dA2 >
0 > dY1=dA2 and the home country exports good 2 while importing good 1. However, with
only two goods ￿1 = S0 < S1 < S2 = 1 i.e., both countries must produce both goods.
Thus, sharp Ricardian specialization cannot occur.
339. Trade and Inequality
The Heckman and Sedlacek model that we are using, and indeed most variants of the Roy
model of labour markets, yield very rich predictions about the determinants of inequality.
Given length constraints of this paper, we focus on within-industry inequality. Despite the
importance of within-industry inequality ￿after all, trade policy is typically conducted at
the industry level ￿within-industry inequality has received virtually no attention. Bartel
and Sicherman (1999) is the exception.
Consider a tari⁄-induced increase in the price of good i. As in ￿gure 4, this expands
both ends of the interval [Si￿1;Si]. Recall from ￿gure 2 that average wages take on their
extreme values at S = Si￿1 and S = Si.17 Thus, within-industry inequality rises because
the tari⁄ attracts workers both with very high and very low wages. Theorem 8 formalizes
this.

















Further, an increase in the industry i price lowers inequality in industries i ￿ 1 and i + 1:
dV(wi￿1 (S;L)ji ￿ 1)
dqi
< 0 and
V(wi+1 (S;L)ji + 1)
dqi
< 0:
17If ￿i+￿ > 0 then S = Si is the maximum of E(wi (S;L)jS) and S = Si￿1 is the minimum. If ￿i+￿ < 0
then S = Si is the minimum and S = Si￿1 is the maximum.
34The proof appears in appendix Kand uses the fact that dV(S￿ji)=dS￿
i > 0 and dV(S￿ji)=dS￿
i￿1 <
0. We emphasize that international trade impacts on inequality only via the sorting rule
i.e., only via the impact of qi on Si and S￿
i￿1.18
It is tempting to argue that international trade must either lower or raise inequality in
all industries. Theorem 8 make it clear that international trade can raise inequality in
some industries while lowering inequality in others. To investigate further we calculated
changes in within-industry inequality using 1984-1994 Current Population Survey data. We
found that 1984-94 changes in V(wi (S;L)ji) ranged from ￿0:06 in Logging to +0:11 in
Footwear. Thus, despite rising inequality economy-wide, changes in industry-level inequality
have varied widely across industries. Equation (15) serves as a basis for investigating whether
this variation can be explained by industry-speci￿c trade shocks.
This leads us naturally to a discussion of how within-industry inequality is impacted
by international trade (changes in qi) versus skill-biased technical change (changes in ￿i).
Both of these alter the sorting rule Si = (qi ￿ qi+1 + Ai ￿ Ai+1)=(￿i+1 ￿ ￿i). However,
only skill-biased technical change has direct e⁄ects on inequality. The reason is a deep
one. Earnings depend on price multiplicatively so that a price change has a proportionate
e⁄ect on the earnings of all workers in the industry. Restated, qi has no direct e⁄ect on the
within-industry variance of log earnings. qi operates only via the sorting rule. In contrast,
skill biased technical change has the direct e⁄ect of making S more productive. Figure 6
illustrates this point.
In the left-hand panel of ￿gure 6, a rise in the price of industry 2 raises inequality in
18All the key insights of this section hold when we additionally condition on observable worker character-
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Figure 6: Trade Versus Skill Biased Technical Change.
industry 2 and lowers it in industry 1. This occurs as a result of worker sorting.19 In
contrast, not only does skill biased technical change a⁄ect the sorting rule, it also a⁄ects
the productivity of S. This appears in the right-hand panel of ￿gure 6 where a rise in ￿2
steepens the earnings pro￿le of industry 2. A rise in ￿2 can increase or decrease S1. In
￿gure 6 we illustrate the case where skill biased technical change decreases S1. In this case,
the sorting e⁄ect complements the direct productivity e⁄ect in increasing inequality. More
generally, the two e⁄ects can be o⁄setting, which raises the possibility that unskilled-biased
technical change in developing countries may have raised inequality there.
A key conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that skill biased technical change has
a richer set of channels for altering within-industry inequality than does international trade.
19Since ￿gure 6 plots wi(S;L) ￿ L, for this claim to be rigorous we must know what is happening to the
variance of L. However, the variance of L conditional on S is just 1 ￿ ￿2. Since this is independent of S
and the industry of a¢ liation, we can ignore the variance of L.
36Both trade and skill biased technical change a⁄ect inequality by altering the sorting rule.
However, only skill biased technical change has direct e⁄ects on within-industry inequality.
This is due to the fact that skill biased technical change di⁄erentially alters workers￿marginal
products whereas trade alters all workers￿marginal products by the same proportion. Our
observation thus o⁄ers a deep insight into relative channels for the trade-and-wages debate.
10. Conclusions
We examined the implications of worker sorting for the patterns of domestic production
and international trade as well as for the demand for protection, income distribution and
economic development. Borrowing from Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), our model featured
heterogeneous workers who di⁄er in two dimensions e.g., problem solving and communication
skills.
We started o⁄ by showing that two-skill heterogeneity leads to much richer predictions
for production, earnings, and inequality than does the one-skill heterogeneity of, say, Leamer
(1999). We then described how higher moments of the bivariate distribution of skills are
interesting predictors of trade between rich countries. For example, ￿ have and have-not￿
economies such as the United States with its high ￿ will export S-intensive goods to Sweden
and import L-intensive goods from Sweden. For another example, economies with high
levels of endowment inequality will export goods that intensively use either S or L, but not
both. We used this to explain U.S. dominance in industries such as ￿lm and information
technologies and to explain German dominance in machinery and other ￿ O-Ring￿reliable
goods involving long chains of production.
37A key feature of our model is that it yields sharp and easily characterized predictions
about international patterns of production and trade, even in the case of many goods. In
the Heckscher-Ohlin model these predictions are sharp and easily characterized only in the
2-good, 2-factor case. The Heckscher-Ohlin predictions fall ￿ at in all other cases.20 In the
Speci￿c Factors model the patterns of production and trade depend on impossibly detailed
supply elasticities (Jones and Neary, 1984, page 24). These elasticities in turn depend on
the cross-industry distribution of industry-speci￿c factors, a distribution that is exogenous
and for which little intuition is available. Thus, our model provides a major improvement
in our ability to concisely and intuitively predict international patterns of production and
trade.
Our model o⁄ers an alternative explanation for the demand for protection. The Heckscher-
Ohlin model predicts factor-based lobbying, which has proved useful for understanding broad
trade policy debates between labour and capital e.g., Rogowski (1989) and O￿ Rourke and
Williamson (1999). The Speci￿c Factors model predicts industry-based lobbying, which is
useful for understanding short-run lobbying by industries with clearly identi￿able and ex-
ogenous speci￿c factors e.g., mining. Our model predicts both industry- and factor-based
lobbying and emphasizes the tension within an industry between those who are endogenously
immobile (demanders of industry-based protection) and those who are endogenously mobile
(demanders of factor-based protection). Our analysis o⁄ers an empirically implementable
framework for thinking about the sources of worker immobility or speci￿city, something the
Speci￿c Factors model does not and cannot o⁄er.
20(i) In the even model with many goods and factors, predictions depend on the complex inverse of the
technology matrix and so have no intuitive appeal. (ii) With more goods than factors the predictions are
indeterminate. (iii) With more factors than goods the model is simply not interesting.
38The model presented o⁄ers two additional insights. It explains how a country with
a backward technology can survive international competition and how this leads to low
earnings. Also, the model has rich predictions about the e⁄ects of trade and skill-biased
technical change on income distribution. Future research suggested by the model includes
(1) empirical work on di⁄erences in inequality across industries, (2) empirical work on the
role of speci￿city for lobbying behaviour, and (3) the role new technologies play in enabling



















Let ￿SL(S￿;L￿) be the standard normal bivariate density function for (S￿;L￿). Let ￿(S￿)
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When a = S￿
i￿1 and b = S￿




























For later reference de￿ne
￿i ￿ ￿i￿ + ￿￿L: (19)
This completes the discussion of notation. We turn next to moments of ￿SL(S￿;L￿ ja <
S￿ < b).
B. Moments of the Truncated Bivariate Normal Distribution
The moment generating function of the truncated normal bivariate distribution is
M(u;t) (20)


















40This is useful because as is shown in any introductory statistics textbook, E[SnLm ja < (S ￿ ￿)=￿ < b]
is given by dn+mM=dundtm evaluated at (u;t) = (0;0). Plugging S￿ = (S ￿ ￿)=￿ into
dM(0;0)=du yields
E(S
￿ ja < S




One can likewise derive
V(S
￿ja < S








￿ < b) = ￿￿LE(S
￿ja < S
￿ < b): (23)
Since wi(S;L) = pi + ￿iS + L = pi + ￿i￿ + ￿i￿S￿ + L, equation (21) and (23) imply
E(wi(S;L)ji) = pi + ￿i￿S + ￿iE(S
￿ji): (24)


























































From equation (17) with b = S￿
i and a = S￿





















From this and equation (20) evaluated at (u;t) = (￿i;1),






















We will use this expression repeatedly in what follows.
41D. Proof of Equation (11)
Di⁄erentiation of equation (27) yields
dlnYi
d￿
= ￿i￿￿L ￿ ￿L
￿(S￿
i ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿(S￿
i￿1 ￿ ￿i)
￿(S￿
i ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿(S￿
i￿1 ￿ ￿i)
:


























where the second equality comes from equation (19) i.e. ￿i￿ = ￿i ￿ ￿￿L. Equation (11)
follows from the de￿nition of Ei(￿i) in lemma 1.
E. Proof of Theorem 2
Let Y W
i be world output of good i. By market clearing it equals world consumption of
good i. Let Ci be home consumption of good i. By homotheticity, Ci=Y W
i equals the home
country￿ s share of world income and so is the same for all i. By theorem 1, Yi=Y W
i is
increasing in i. Hence (Yi ￿ Ci)=Y W
i is increasing in i. Let Ti ￿ Yi ￿ Ci be net exports.
By balanced trade, at least one good is exported and at least one good is imported. Since
Ti=Y W
i is increasing in i, if Ti > 0 then Ti+j > 0 for all j > 0 and if Ti < 0 then Ti￿j < 0
for all j > 0. It follows that there is a unique i￿ < n such that Ti > 0 for i > i￿, Ti￿ ￿ 0,
and Ti < 0 for i < i￿.
F. Proof of Equation (13)
We begin with a preliminary result. Any variance can be rewritten as the expectation of the
square minus the square of the expectation. Thus, V(S￿
i ja < S￿ < b) = E(S￿2 ja < S￿ < b)￿
[E(S￿ ja < S￿ < b)]











We next provide an expression for dlnYi=dln￿. Di⁄erentiation of equation (27) with


















i + ￿i￿ = (S￿
i ￿ ￿i) + (￿i + ￿i￿), d￿ = ￿dln￿, equation (21) and equation




























We next provide an expression for dlnYi=dln￿L. Di⁄erentiation of equation (27) with
respect to ￿L yields
dlnYi
d￿L
= ￿L + ￿i￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿(S￿
i ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿(S￿
i￿1 ￿ ￿i)
￿(S￿
i ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿(S￿
i￿1 ￿ ￿i)
:
















Finally, from the de￿nition of ￿, an increase in ￿ leads to proportional increases in ￿ and ￿L:





















































2) ￿ 1: (32)
G. Proof of Theorem 4
Let Y W
i be world output of good i. By market clearing it equals world consumption of
good i. Let Ci be home consumption of good i: By homotheticity, Ci=Y W
i equals the home
country￿ s share of world income and so is the same for all i. By theorem 3, Yi=Y W
i is
increasing in i for i > i￿ and decreasing in i for i ￿ i￿. Let Ti ￿ Yi ￿ Ci be net exports.
Then Ti=Y W
i is increasing in i for i > i￿ and decreasing in i for i ￿ i￿. It follows that if
i￿ were exported (Ti￿ > 0) then all goods are exported. By balanced trade at least one
industry must be imported. Hence i￿ is imported.
Suppose some good i > i￿ is exported. Then since Ti=Y W
i is increasing in i there must
be a good i￿ such that Ti < 0 for i = i￿;:::;i￿ ￿ 2; Ti￿￿1 ￿ 0; and Ti > 0 for i = i￿;:::;n.
Similarly, suppose that some good i < i￿ is exported. Then since Ti=Y W
i is decreasing in
i there must be a good i￿ such that Ti > 0 for i = 1;:::;i￿ ￿ 1; Ti￿ ￿ 0; and Ti < 0 for
i = i￿ + 1;:::;i￿. It remains to show that some good i > i￿ is exported and some good
i < i￿ is exported.
Let ￿ be the home country￿ s income share. By homotheticity, Ci = ￿Y W
i . Since i￿ < n
by assumption, theorem 3 implies Yn > ￿Y w
n . Hence Tn ￿ Yn ￿ Cn > 0 i.e., some good
i > i￿ is exported. Since i￿ > 1 by assumption, theorem 3 implies Y1 > ￿Y w
1 . Hence
43T1 ￿ Y1 ￿ C1 > 0 i.e., some good i < i￿ is exported.








i ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿(S￿
i￿1 ￿ ￿i)
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i￿1 ￿ ￿i)
+ ￿i:
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Equation (14) follows from the de￿nition of Ei(￿i) in lemma 1.
I. Proof of Theorem 6
By comparison of equations (11) and (14), the proof is identical to the proof of theorem 2.
J. Proof of Theorem 7


























































To prove part 2 of the theorem let Y W
i be world output of good i. By market clearing
it equals world consumption of good i. Let Ci be home consumption of good i: By homo-
theticity, Ci = ￿Y W
i for all i where ￿ is the home country￿ s share of world income. By part 1,
Yi > ￿Y W
i ; Yi￿1 < ￿Y W
i￿1, and Yi+1 < ￿Y W
i+1. Hence Ti ￿ Yi ￿ Ci > 0, Ti￿1 < 0 and Ti+1 > 0.
Finally, Yj = ￿Y W
j for j < i ￿ 1 and j > i + 1 so that Tj = 0.
44K. Proof of Theorem 8
From equation (26) with V(S￿ji) written out in full as V(S￿jS￿
i￿1 < S￿ < S￿
i ), the derivative




























From equations (2) and (5), dS￿
i =dqi = 1=(￿i+1 ￿ ￿i) and dS￿
i￿1=dqi = 1=(￿i ￿ ￿i￿1) from
which equation (15) follows. Heckman and Sedlacek (1985, proposition 1) states that
dV(S￿ji)=dS￿
i > 0 and dV(S￿ji)=dS￿
i￿1 < 0 if S￿ is distributed according to a log concave
distribution. The normal distribution is log concave. Applying this to equation (15) yields
dV(w(S;L)ji)=dqi > 0:
The derivatives of the within-industry variance of log earnings in industries i ￿ 1 and
i + 1 with respect to qi are given by:
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